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I. INTRODUCTION
The 1992 case of Schoenberg v. Shapolsky Publishers, Inc. 'is
the latest in a string of decisions that have long troubled lawyers in-
volved in copyright litigation. The case may seem innocuous to the
layperson, merely involving the question of whether or not an action
based on a copyright license actually "arose under" the Copyright
Act of 1976.2 "What," the copyright novice would ask, "is the big
deal?" If the complaint alleges a violation of the Copyright Act, then
it is evident that the claim arises under the Act. Out of the mouths
of babes, as the saying goes.
The problem stems from the U.S. Constitution itself. Article III
of the Constitution grants federal courts original jurisdiction over
cases 'arising under' the Constitution, federal statutes, and treaties.
This grant of jurisdiction has since been expanded by Congress in 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1982), which states that "district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitu-
tion, laws, or treaties of the United States." This terminology has
proven so ambiguous, however, that the tension surrounding
"arising under" jurisdiction has long been a favorite topic for dis-
cussion among jurists and scholars.4
This "arising under" language has been troublesome in the area
of intellectual property, most notably in copyright infringement
suits.5 The difficulty arises because a copyright infringement claim
1. 971 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1992).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (amended 1990).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 2, cl. 1.
4. See Mary P. Twitchell, Characterizing Federal Claims: Preemption, Removal, and
the Arising-Under Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 812, 812 n.2
(1986)[hereinafter Characterizing Federal Claims].
5. It has been widely recognized that actions in copyright, patent and trademark law
closely resemble one another and are guided largely by the same principles. See, e.g.,
Foxrun Workshop, Ltd. v. Mone Mfg., 686 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Tollinger v. Ithaca
Gun Co., No. 86-CV-1351, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3230, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 1988);
Bear Creek Productions v. Saleh, 643 F. Supp. 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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often alleges a breach of contract.6 Contract-based claims- are gov-
erned by state common law and are heard in state courts; whereas
copyright actions are heard in federal.courts. 7 As a practical matter,
however, many copyright actions, like patent actions; may be
pleaded as either federal or state causes of action.8  -
Actions brought in copyright, patent and trademark .are
brought under the, express grant of jurisdiction to- federal courts
found in 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), which states that "[the district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any
Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copy-
rights and trade-marks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the
courts of the states in patent, plant variety protection and copyright
cases." It is this grant of federal subject-matter jurisdiction over
claims "arising under" the Copyright Act of 1976' that has led to
conflicting policies in the Second Circuit.
The Supreme Court has given "arising under" a narrow mean-
ing as it applies to statutes defining the jurisdiction of the lower
courts. 10 It has consistently been held that not every copyright action
arises under the Copyright Act, and "the undoubted truth that a
claim for infringement 'arises under' the Copyright Act does not es-
tablish that nothing else can.""
The Second Circuit case of T.B. Harms v. Eliscu,2 nebulously
held that "[e]ven though a claim is created by state law, a case may
6. This can been seen with only a moment's reflection: when a copyright is issued,
the holder of the copyright is the only party that may make use of the copyrighted. mate-
rials absent an express license to a third party. Most people, mindful of the hazards of
litigation, would rather pay for a license than for an attorney. Therefore, the most com-
mon means of copyright infringement is when the copyright holder and some third party
get their "wires crossed."
7. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMER ON COPYRIGHT, §12.01[A] at 12-3 (22 ed.
1985) [hereinafter NIMMER].
8. See, e.g., Luckett v. Delpark, 270 U.S. 496, 511 (1926)("If in that case the patentee
complainant had based his action on his patent right and had sued for infringement, and
by anticipation of a defense of the assignment had alleged a forfeiture by his own decla-
ration without seeking aid of the court, jurisdiction under the patent laws would have at-
tached, and he would have had to meet the claim by the defendant that forfeiture of the
license or assignment and restoration of title could not be had except by a decree of a
court, which if sustained, would have defeated his prayer for an injunction on the merits.
But when the patentee exercises his choice and bases his action on the contract and seeks
remedies thereunder, he may not give the case a double aspect, so to speak, and make it a
patent case conditioned on his securing equitable relief as to the contract.")
9. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (amended 1990).
10. See T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 825 (2d Cir. 1964) (citing Romero v.
International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379 n. 51 (1959)); Shoshone Mining
Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505 (1900); Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District
Courts, 53 COLumi. L. REv. 157, 160-63 (1953).
11. 339 F.2d 823, 825.
12. Id. at 823.
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'arise under' a law of the United States if the complaint discloses a
need for determining the meaning or application of such a law."1
3
This decision, rather than assisting a lower court reach its determi-
nation, only complicates matters. For example, how should this need
be disclosed, explicitly or implicitly? If disclosed explicitly, is it still
possible for a court to find that the allegation does not "arise under"
the federal laws? If disclosed implicitly, is there a chance that an
appeals court would still find that the allegation does not "arise un-
der" the federal laws, thereby wasting large amounts of time and
money?
This Comment focuses on the Second Circuit's history of deci-
sions determining when federal subject-matter jurisdiction exists,
from T.B. Harms v. Eliscu, through the different interpretations of
the T.B. Harms test, to the 1992 decision of Schoenberg v. Shapolsky
Publishers, Inc., a case in which the Second Circuit has attempted to
reconcile and integrate the opposing views into one coherent test for
the district courts to use.
The author also critically analyzes the constituent parts of the
various incarnations of the T.B. Harms rationale and devises a more
coherent and realistic formula for determining the existence or ab-
sence of subject-matter jurisdiction. This new hypothesis will take
into account, and compensate for, the shortcomings of previous
models while providing a rational alternative for future cases.
11. T.B. HARMS v. ELIsCU: A CLEAR RIVER
The debate over characterization of a claim as either copyright
or contract stems from the landmark case of T.B. Harms v. Eliscu,14
a case concerning the music for four songs written by Vincent You-
mans 5 and used in the motion picture "Flying Down to Rio."" RKO,
the producer of the film, entered into a contract with Youmans,
whereby Youmans agreed to assign the rights to the music to RKO
provided that the film company would employ a lyricist and procure
publishing rights for him; 7 Youmans was to pay the lyricist royal-
13. Id. at 827.
14. 226 F. Supp. 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), affd, 339 F.2d 823 (2d. Cir. 1964).
15. The music for the film "Flying Down to Rio," including the title track, caused
Vincent Youmans to be ranked with Irving Berlin as one of the greatest musical compos-
ers. He is also responsible for the well-known hit, "Tea for Two." Charles Guenther, Wiz.
ards of Tin Pan Alley, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 28, 1990, at 5C.
16. "Flying Down to Rio," which premiered in New York City in 1933, was the first
of ten films featuring Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire. The film has been described as "a
zany romp that is still a lot of fun and has some wild moments, notably the mid-air pro-
duction number with a score of chorus girls dancing on the wings of planes." Joseph
Gelmis, The Dream Dance Duo, NEWSDAY, Jan. 24, 1992, at 82.
17. Such an arrangement was common during the earlier part of the twentieth cen-
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ties on any revenues received.18 Youmans was given the right to as-
sign the publication and small performing rights for the songs. 9
RKO then hired two songwriters (Kahn and Eliscu), who as-
signed certain rights back to RKO. Youmans' reserve rights to the
music were then assigned to Max Dreyfus."0 Allegedly, and this is
the crux of the matter, in an agreement dated June 30, 1933, Eliscu
assigned his rights to the existing renewal copyrights to Dreyfus
(and by succession, T.B. Harms) in return for royalty payments.2'
Eliscu later brought action, predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1338, denying
the agreement and demanding an accounting and a declaration of a
one-third ownership in the rights from T.B. Harms.2
Judge Weinfeld determined that there was not enough evidence
to support the plaintiffs allegations and no infringement had oc-
curred since plaintiff did not actually use, violate or threaten the
copyrights. 23 Therefore, Weinfeld reasoned, the charge of infringe-
ment and the request for an injunction and accounting was merely a
suit to enforce a contract and was not an action arising under the
federal copyright laws. Weinfeld held that the action would be set-
tled in the concurrent state court action. T.B. Harms Co. then ap-
pealed to the Second Circuit claiming that Judge Weinfeld's dis-
missal for want of subject matter jurisdiction was in error; Judge
Friendly affirmed the decision and, in the process replaced Wein-
feld's clarity with confusion. 5
Judge Friendly began his analysis by noting that no infringe-
ment was present; however, he added that 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a),
tury, as it was rare for the composer of a song to also write the lyrics. Therefore, the
movie studio would frequently purchase the music from one party and then obtain words
from someone else.
18. T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 824.
19. Id.
20. Dreyfus was the principle shareholder in T.B. Harms, Inc. to whom the rights
succeeded. Id.
21. Id. Judge Weinfeld, writing for the Southern District of New York, found this to
be the crucial issue. T.B. Harms, 226 F. Supp. 337, 338.
22. Unfortunately, the facts enunciated in each Harms decision leave the reader
with only a vague picture of what had actually transpired. For purposes of this Comment,
however, all the reader needs to know is that the issue in this action was which party ac-
tually owned the copyrighted materials.
23. Eliscu had (1) commenced an action in New York State Supreme Court for a de-
claratory judgement that he was owner of the renewed copyrights; (2) written to the
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) advising it of his claim
and demanding royalty payments; (3) demanded through his attorney of plaintiffs attor-
ney the amount of royalties collected by the agent on behalf of the plaintiff; and (4) en-
tered into an agreement with co-defendant assigning his rights to him, and filed the as-
signment with the Register of Copyrights. T.B. Harms, 226 F. Supp. at 339.
24. Id. at 340 (quoting Danks v. Gordon, 272 F. 821, 827 (2d Cir. 1921)).
25. T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964).
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which controls federal jurisdiction in copyright actions, does not
mention infringement, thereby leading him to conclude that "the
undoubted truth that a claim for infringement 'arises under' the
Copyright Act does not establish that nothing else can."2 6
Friendly held the "ingredient theory,"27 was not applicable in
light of Supreme Court intellectual property doctrine enunciated in
New Marshall Engine Co. v. Marshall Engine Co.28 He did, however,
find merit in the "creation test" set forth by Justice Holmes in
American Well Works Co. v. Layne Bowler Co.,29 which maintains
that a copyright suit arises under the law that creates the cause of
action; because the federal copyright laws do not create a cause of
action to fix the locus of ownership, however, Friendly held the Hol-
mes test inapplicable here.30
Friendly did, however, point out that a cause of action brought
to fix ownership of a copyright may arise under federal laws if the
complaint discloses a need to determine the meaning or application
of a federal law.3 Referring to DeSylva v. Ballentine,12 he concluded
that the pleading of a pivotal question can suffice to grant federal
jurisdiction even for a "state-created" claim. 3 Then, in a widely-cited
portion of the opinion, Friendly formulated, an enigmatic and what
26. Id. at 825.
27. The "ingredient theory," suggested by Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn v. Bank
of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 822-27 (1824), a case based on the statute
that created the Bank of the United States rather than a statutory grant of jurisdiction,
stated that where a federal law is a necessary ingredient of the claim then federal juris-
diction existed. In subsequent Supreme Court cases, however, the "arising under" lan-
guage has been given a far narrower meaning for statutes defining the jurisdiction of the
lower federal courts. See, e.g., Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S.
354(1959).
Marshall suggested that the "ingredient theory" was to be applied when determining
whether there is federal subject-matter jurisdiction in the absence of a specific statutory
grant. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 822-27. In contrast, the Harms case was brought un-
der an explicit grant ofjurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1993).
28. 223 U.S. 473, 478 (1912). In New Marshall Engine, a case involving the question
of title to a patent, the Court said: "The Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of all
cases arising under the patent laws, but not of all questions in which a patent may be the
subject-matter of the controversy. For courts of a state may construe and enforce con-
tracts relating to patents." Id.
29. 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916).
30. T.B. Harms v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 826-27 (2d Cir. 1964). See also Franchise
Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1983) (holding the
Holmes test too narrow).
31. T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 827.
32. 351 U.S. 570 (1956). DeSylva involved a claim of partial ownership of copyright
renewal terms, a situation very similar to the T.B. Harms case. There, the Supreme
Court took jurisdiction based on the presentation of two questions of construction of the
Copyright Act.
33. T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 828.
1994] COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 125
has proven to be a severely misunderstood test for determining
when an action does or does not "arise under" the Copyright Act:
An action "arises under" the Copyright Act if and only if the complaint is
for a remedy expressly granted by the Act, e.g., a suit for infringement...
or asserts a claim requiring construction of the Act .... or, at the very
least and perhaps more doubtfully, presents a case where a distinctive
policy of the Act requires that federal principles control the disposition of
the claim. The general interest that copyrights, like all other forms of
property, should be enjoyed by their true owner is not enough to meet this
last test.
34
Here, Friendly found that on the face of the complaint none of these
conditions were met. Therefore, he rejected the plaintiffs claims and
denied subject-matter jurisdiction.
III. SECOND CIRCUIT INTERPRETATIONS OF
FRIENDLY'S TEST: MUCKING UP THE WATERS
A. Overview
Judge Friendly has, with a single paragraph, left a legacy of
confusion that has led to a series of apparently irreconcilable judi-
cial opinions and rules in the Second Circuit. Initially, there is the
"essence of the claim" interpretation of T.B. Harms, espoused first in
Elan Associates, Ltd. v. Quackenbush Music, Ltd. 5 This interpreta-
tion makes use of only one part of the district court ruling in T.B.
Harms35 to state that the "formal allegations of the complaint must
yield to the substance of the claim."
37
34. Id. at 828.
35. 339 F. Supp. 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). See also,
Lukasewych v. Wells, Rich, Greene, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D.N.Y.
1990)(following the essence of claim test); Felix Cinematografica, S.R.I. v. Penthouse Int'l,
Ltd., 671 F. Supp. 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)(same); Berger v. Simon & Schuster, 631 F. Supp.
915 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)(same); Bear Creek Productions, Inc. v. Saleh, 643 F. Supp. 489
(S.D.N.Y. 1986)(applying the essence of the claim test to trademark infringement cases);
Rotardier v. Entertainment Company Music Group, 518 F. Supp. 919, 921 (S.D.N.Y.
1981)(stating that not all copyright-based controversies give rise to federal jurisdiction);
Keith v. Scruggs, 507 F. Supp. 968, 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)("To determine whether the claim
'arises under' the copyright laws, the court must look to the 'essence of the plaintiffs
claim.'"); Newman v. Crowell, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 517, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)(maintaining
that questions of copyright ownership are best left to the state courts); Stepdesign, Inc. v.
Research Media, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 32, 33-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)(holding that the entire focus
of the complaint was on alleged contractual breaches, and that any finding of infringe-
ment would be merely incidental to the main purpose of the suit).
36. "In considering the plea of lack ofjurisdiction, the formal allegations must yield
to the substance of the claim. The mere circumstance that the suit incidentally centers
about a copyright does not, in and of itself, support federal jurisdiction." T.B. Harms, 226
F. Supp. at 338 (citations omitted).
37. Id. at 338.
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While this interpretation was taking hold in the Second Circuit,
another line of cases, based primarily upon the 1982 case of
Kamakazi Music Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp.,38 was developing.
This latter line of cases maintains that if a complaint is explicitly
one for copyright infringement, then any argument on defendant's
part that the issues presented are for contract violation are
"frivolous."39 Following the Kamakazi rationale, another line of so-
called "well-pled complaint" decisions arose from the district
courts." These decisions essentially held that an examination of
what was disclosed on the face of the complaint was sufficient; if
copyright infringement was alleged, then the case was within the
federal court's jurisdiction.
Although these two interpretations seem irreconcilable they
each implicitly turn on what the complaint is "really about." In order
to recognize the distinction between the two interpretations, how-
ever, one must consider the cases critically rather than casually, as
the district courts have. This has proven a relatively simple task in
extreme cases, such as when the plaintiffs complaint alleges only
copyright infringement and discloses no alternative ground for re-
covery, but it is more difficult where the complaint is not so clear.41
B. The "essence of the claim" and Elan Associates, Ltd. v.
Quackenbush Music, Ltd.: What are they really saying?
The first case that enunciated the "essence of the claim" inter-
pretation of T.B. Harms was Elan Associates, Ltd. v. Quackenbush
Music, Ltd.42 The case arose from the execution of a contract which
provided that the plaintiff would enjoy the exclusive right to publish
and obtain copyrights on certain music by Carly Simon; defendant,
however, continued to obtain copyrights. Plaintiff sued for breach of
contract in New York State court and concurrently sued for copy-
right infringement.
Looking beyond the wording of the complaint, Judge Cannella
interpreted the T. B. Harms test to state that the federal court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction, as this case "essentially" involved
38. 684 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1982).
39. Id. at 230.
40. See, e.g., TGI Friday's, Inc. v. National Restaurants Management, Inc., 1992 WL
164445 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Marshall v. New Kids on the Block Partnership, 780 F. Supp.
1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Daniel Wilson Productions, Inc. v. Time-Life Films, Inc., 736 F.
Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Foxrun Workshop, Ltd. v. Klone Mfg, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 86
(S.D.N.Y. 1988); CBS Catalogue Partnership v. CBS/FOX Co., 668 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y.
1987); Lieberman v. Estate of Chayefsky, 535 F. Supp. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
41. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, 2 COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES, LAw AND PRACTIcE, § 13.2.1, at 386-
87(1989).
42. 339 F. Supp. 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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a dispute as to the ownership of the copyright.43 The court found
that the resolution of the dispute
ultimately depends upon the validity of the plaintiff's exclusive publishing
agreement with- Simon, which is presently being litigated in the New York
court.... [A]lthough the action is cast in terms of infringement, in reality
the suit is merely one to establish valid title by seeking to enforce a con-
tract between an author and a publisher. Therefore, the case is not one
which arises under the copyright laws so as to invoke the jurisdiction of
this court.44
This interpretation of T.B. Harms was also used in Stepdesign,
Inc. v. Research Media, Inc.,4 in which plaintiff sought a declaratory
order that certain copyrights had reverted to him upon breach of
contract; therefore, the suit was merely one to determine ownership
of the copyright.46
Judge Weinfeld,47 relying on T.B. Harms, noted that questions
of contract ownership are not necessarily questions for the federal
courts.48 Following a logical progression, Weinfeld looked to see
whether there was any underlying claim of infringement on which to
base federal jurisdiction, as "the formal allegations of the complaint
must yield to the substance of the claim."49 Finding no infringement
claim,"0 and that the plaintiff had not "directed his pleading against
the offending use, [but rather] has sued to set the license aside,"5'
Weinfeld held that jurisdiction did not exist.
This latter application of the "essence of the claim" interpreta-
tion makes a tremendous amount of sense. Judge Weinfeld, who
took part in the original T.B. Harms, was able to interpret the T.B.
43. Id. at 462.
44. Id. (citations omitted).
45. 442 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
46. The complaint alleged nonpayment of royalties payable under the contract, fail-
ure to give plaintiff proper authorship credit, and failure to pay plaintiff its share of reve-
nues derived from sales. Id. at 33.
47. It is interesting to note that Judge Weinfeld authored the original T.B. Harms
decision. See T.B. Harms v. Eliscu, 226 F. Supp. 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
48. 442 F. Supp. at 33 (citing T.B. Harms v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 826 (2d Cir. 1964),
cert. den., 381 U.S. 915 (1965)); See also Wells v. Universal Pictures Co., 166 F.2d 690,
691 (2d Cir. 1948); Muse v. Mellin, 212 F. Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), affd, 339 F.2d 888
(2d Cir. 1964).
49. 442 F. Supp. at 33 (citing T.B. Harms v. Eliscu, 226 F. Supp. 337, 338 (S.D.N.Y.
1964)).
50. Id. at 33-34. Weinfeld gave the complaint a "fair reading" and determined that,
because the "entire focus" of the complaint was on the alleged breach of contract, "[the
primary purpose [was] to reestablish plaintiff as owner of the copyrights... "Id.
51. Id. (citing T.B. Harms v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 825 (2d Cir. 1964)). Weinfeld
found that, because the complaint was focused entirely on the contractual breaches, "any
finding of infringement would be clearly incidental to the main purpose of plaintiffs suit."
Id.
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Harms test properly. In this case, Weinfeld noted that the complaint
didn't actually state a claim on which relief could be granted under
federal law; however, by giving it a "fair reading," he inferred an un-
derlying claim that would give rise to federal jurisdiction. Only after
finding that the underlying purpose of the complaint was for a con-
tractual remedy did he deny jurisdiction.
In this case the interpretation given to T.B. Harms was more
realistic than that in Elan Associates, Ltd. v. Quackenbush Music,
Ltd., since the underlying claim was for breach of contract, not
copyright infringement. Using this interpretation, actions to estab-
lish title in a copyright have been consistently held to not arise un-
der federal laws. 2 One such case worth noting in this context is the
oft-cited Berger v. Simon & Schuster.53 In Berger, the dispute was
whether a contract had been breached, which would have caused the
copyright to revert to the plaintiff. The complaint was phrased en-
tirely in terms of copyright infringement and the contractual dispute
was completely ignored. 4
The court realized that the issue of whether an action "arises
under" the copyright laws is, more often than not, difficult to an-
swer,5 5 and that often the circumstances of the dispute must be
called into question. Judge Sand, noting that the plaintiff only insti-
tuted suit after his subsequently published book was a bestseller,
held that "once the contractual rights and duties of the parties are
resolved, the Court so doing will not be called upon to make any de-
termination about whether defendant's publication is an infringe-
ment.
56
Judge Sand's conclusion that the action was primarily one
where the plaintiff's "real concern is not the recovery of monetary
damages or that defendant be enjoined, but rather that he be free to
publish his work with another publisher on terms which will be re-
flective of his enhanced stature as the author of a best seller" 7 can-
not be disputed. The record shows that this was the case." The out-
come of a suit in contract will not, however, necessarily foreclose any
question of infringement. 9 If the court finds that the defendant
breached a contract there will need to be another suit to decide
whether there was an infringement that may be enjoined since fed-
eral courts are granted original jurisdiction to impose this remedy in
52. See generally cases discussed in this section.
53. 631 F. Supp. 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
54. Id. at 918-19.
55. Id. at 917.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 919 (citations omitted).
58. Id. at 916-17.
59. See Kamakazi Music Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp., 684 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1982).
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copyright cases. Without allowing such a cause of action to stand,
the plaintiff will be denied proper relief.
This pitfall of the "essence of the claim" formulation, though
crucial to its validity, has largely been ignored. It has repeatedly,
and incorrectly, been said that a contract dispute forecloses a copy-
right action. As the court stated in Felix Cinematografica, S.R.I. v.
Penthouse Int'l, Ltd.,6o
[tihe central and only issue... is what rights defendant received... If de-
fendant received the right to distribute videocassettes, then it has not
violated the copyright laws. If, on the other hand, defendant did not re-
ceive that right ... then it has infringed plaintiff's copyright and is liable
for the damages suffered.6 '
Even if the issue is contractual on its face, the underlying question
of whether a copyright was infringed upon still exists. In order to
make that determination it is necessary to consider the contract, but
by no means should a contract be an absolute bar to jurisdiction over
the action.62 Rather, the district court should understand that since
a breach of contract finding will result in a case being returned to
the federal court, it is in the interests of judicial economy to hear the
matter as one, addressing both contract and copyright issues.63
Another flaw in the "essence of the claim" test is that even in
the clearest of situations, the determination of state or federal ju-
risdiction may often turn on the ephemeral issue of the plaintiffs
"primary and controlling" purpose." This is different from looking to
the parties' intent, as the contract is not analyzed in this fashion;
rather, jurisdiction hinges on what the judge believes the contract
symbolizes. This elevates the judge to one who not only judges, but
60. 671 F. Supp. 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
61. Id. at 314.
62. Similarly, it has been stated that the fact that questions of copyright law may
need to be determined in an action does not necessarily oust state jurisdiction. See
NIMMER, supra note 7, § 12.01[A] at 12-15 nn.6 & 10 and accompanying text. Since this is
the case, it stands to reason that the reverse would be true, and that the presence of a
contract claim in a copyright action should not oust federal jurisdiction in all cases. Id. at
§ 12.01[A] [1].
63. Judge Friendly counters this argument by reasoning that copyrights do not carry
with them any national significance, and the unexpansive theory of federal jurisdiction is
strong with respect to copyrights and patents mainly because expansion would deprive
state courts of any jurisdiction in these matters. T.B. Harms v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 826
(2d. Cir. 1964). However, this argument is less than persuasive; copyrights are issued by
the federal government, so they are necessarily imbued with national importance - if not,
then the federal government would yield this power to the states. However, policy inter-
ests dictate that this cannot be the case. This, as well as the fact that Congress has pre-
empted state law with the Copyright Act, proves that there is at least some measure of
national importance behind copyrights.
64. NIMER, supra note 7, § 12.01[A] at 12-4.
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one who determines what is to be judged. 5
C. The "well-pled complaint: What they say is what they mean.
The second interpretation of T.B. Harms stems from Judge
Friendly's statement that "[flederal jurisdiction is held to exist if the
plaintiff has directed his pleading against the offending use, refer-
ring to the license only by way of anticipatory replication."6 '6 This
interpretation holds, in essence, that whatever the plaintiff pleads is
what he means, and that the court should not engage in any inter-
pretation of the complaint.
The Second Circuit case that first made use of this interpreta-
tion was Kamakazi Music Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp. ,67 which in-
volved a license to print and sell sheet music composed by Barry
Manilow. Defendant continued to sell the sheet music after the con-
tract had expired, and the plaintiff sued for infringement under the
Copyright Act, seeking injunctive relief; the complaint did not men-
tion breach of contract .6  Making use of the "well-pled complaint"
rule, the court held that the plaintiffs complaint was sufficient to
create a cause of action under the Copyright Act.69
The parties entered into arbitration pursuant to an order of the
court,70 and the arbitrator held that the defendant had indeed wil-
fully sold the sheet music after the expiration of the contract,
thereby violating plaintiffs copyrights 7 Defendant appealed to the
Second Circuit, claiming that the action was actually one for breach
of contract. In upholding jurisdiction, the court stated that
65. This elevation of the court's role is not only undesirable, but also illegal. In Ar-
thur Young & Co. v. City of Richmond, 895 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1990), the Fourth Circuit
ruled "that the district court's search for the principal and controlling issue in the case
exceeded the limited factual inquiry necessary" for a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 969.
66. T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 825 (emphasis added).
67. 684 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1982).
68. It is interesting to note how similar the complaint in this case was to that in
Berger. Neither complaint made mention of contract issues, yet opposite results ensued in
each case. Compare Berger v. Simon & Schuster, 631 F. Supp. 915, 918-19 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) with Kamakazi, 684 F.2d at 230.
In Berger, the complaint was also in terms of infringement; contract breach was not
even mentioned, yet the court still held that contract violations were at the center of the
breach. Berger, 631 F. Supp. at 919. The court also held that once the contract claims
were settled, those based in copyright would disappear. Id. at 917-18. However, in Kami-
kaze, the contract dispute was settled by the arbitrator's determination that certain
grants were not included in the license. Kamakazi, 684 F.2d at 230. Still, after the con-
tract was settled, the copyright claim had to be resolved.
69. Kamakazi, 684 F.2d at 229.
70. Id. The contract at issue in the case provided for arbitration.
71. Id. at 230.
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Kamakazi's suit is, was, and always has been based on the Copyright
Act.... Given the explicit usage of Kamakazi's complaint, and the acts
complained of, it is frivolous for Robbins to contend that its contractual
defense makes Kamakazi's suit one for breach of contract. The district
court had jurisdiction because the claim was for copyright infringement.
The claim sent to the arbitrator was for copyright infringement. The dam-
ages calculated by the arbitrator at Robbins' urging were for copyright in-
fringement.
7 2
The "well-pled complaint" interpretation was also used by
Judge Leval in Foxrun Workshop, Ltd. v. Klone Mfg., Inc.,73 to sup-
port the holding that a trademark infringement case based upon
failure to perform obligations under a trademark license agreement
was actionable in federal court. 4 Leval noted that the pleading must
be directed against the offending use, the license must be referred to
only by way of anticipatory replication,75 and that a claim involving
a trademark does not necessarily give rise to federal jurisdiction. 6
In Foxrun, the plaintiffs claimed that rights to use the trade-
marks had been terminated, and that defendants had nevertheless
continued to use the registered trademarks in violation of the Lan-
ham Act. Leval held that "jurisdiction is held to exist where the
plaintiff brings the action for infringement and alleges that the li-
cense has already been terminated for a breach of a condition or that
defendant's acts were outside the scope of the license.""
Leval noted that the plaintiff here directed the complaint to the
trademark infringement, and had instituted a separate suit regard-
ing the breach of contract.7 The "essence of the complaint" interpre-
tation was not applied here, as Leval believed it to be neither
"practical nor in conformity with the... formulation in T.B. Harms,
which looks to the complaint,"79 and therefore the "well-pled complaint"
rule was to be applied to determine that the court had jurisdiction.
72. 684 F.2d at 230 (footnotes omitted).
73. 686 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
74. Federal courts have original jurisdiction in matters involving "patents, plant
variety protection, copyrights, and trade-marks." 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). Therefore, claims
for copyright infringement are analogous to those for trademark infringement. See Bear
Creek Productions, Inc. v. Saleh, 643 F. Supp. 489, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)("Analogous prin-
ciples govern the exercise of federal jurisdiction in all three types of action.") -
75. 686 F. Supp. at 88 (quoting T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir.
1964)).
76. Id. (citing Beghin-Say InVll Inc. v. Ole-Bendt Rasmussen, 733 F.2d 1568 (Fed.Cir.
1984)); RX Data Corp. v. Department of Social Services, 684 F.2d 192, 196 (2d Cir. 1982);
Combs v. Plough, Inc., 681 F.2d 469, 470 (6th Cir. 1982); Lansing Research Corp:v. Sy-
bron Corp., 514 F. Supp. 543 (N.D.N.Y. 1981); Arvin Indus., Inc. v. Berns Air King Corp.,
510 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1975).
77. 686 F. Supp. at 89 (citations omitted).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 90 (citations omitted).
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Leval understood the policy considerations behind using this
interpretation of T.B. Harms, and stated that:
[iut is important to the parties to know from the outset whether the court
has subject matter jurisdiction over the case. The view that the federal
jurisdiction depends on what is at "the heart of the controversy", or by "the
fundamental controversy" can leave jurisdiction open to question as the
parties conduct discovery and refine the issues.80
This opinion, therefore, looks not only to fairness to the parties, but
also implicitly to judicial economy. To look beyond the surface of the
complaint would, in many situations, lead to a denial of jurisdiction
at a late date during the trial, causing the parties to waste efforts in
federal court and forcing them to go through the entire process again
at the state level.
Most recently, the Southern District has renewed the vitality of
the "well-pled complaint" interpretation in Marshall v. New Kids on
the Block Partnership."' This case involved the rights of a pop music
group to use photographs for certain purposes. Defendant claimed
that, in addition to the written contract setting the terms of the li-
cense, an oral contract had been negotiated to include the allegedly
infringing uses."
Judge Patterson knew that the area of law that he was forced
to consider was a "very subtle one," 3 and that the "question leads
down 'one of the darkest corridors of the law of federal courts and
federal jurisdiction. '"' In order to eliminate at least part of the un-
certainty of determining whether jurisdiction arises in a case like
this, he held that the "well-pled complaint rule" was properly ap-
plied here, and that so long as the complaint disclosed the elements
necessary for an infringement claim, the plaintiffs reference to a
contract claim should not foreclose jurisdiction.85
Patterson, however, formulated his reasoning in a manner
slightly different than Leval or any judge before him. Rather than
using a "because I said so" approach, he made use of the theory that
"a claim alleging infringement arises under the copyright laws when
the copyright owner and the alleged infringer are complete strang-
80. Id.
81. 780 F. Supp. 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
82. Id. at 1007.
83. Id. at 1008.
84. Id. (quoting Arthur Young & Co. v. Richmond, 895 F.2d 967, 969 n.2 (4th Cir.
1990)).
85. Id. (citing Vestron, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 839 F.2d 1380, 1382 (9th Cir.
1988)). See also Arthur Young & Co. v. City of Richmond, 895 F.2d 967, 969 (4th Cir.
1990); Kamakazi Music Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp., 684 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1982); T.B.
Harms v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 825 (2d Cir. 1964)(cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1964)).
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ers who have never had any dealings with one anQther.'". The par-
ties can make themselves strangers when one party.uses the license
in a manner that exceeds the duration or scope of the contract; .by
doing-this, the licensee is no different than someonewho infringes
without a license." Therefore, Patterson concluded, jurisdiction de-
pends solely on whether the uses were-within the scope of the -li-
cense. 88 Here, because there was only a written contract that stated
that the uses did exceed the license, jurisdiction was upheld.. -
This opinion is confusing in light of the "essence of the claim"
interpretation found in Elan Associates, Ltd. v. Quackenbush Music,
Ltd.89 The cases are, after all, strikingly similar. In each case the
scope of the license was the controlling issue and the contract claims
were pursued in state court at the same time. In Elan Associates,
however, the court held that the resolution of the contract claims
would eliminate the copyright infringement claims,9" while the court
in New Kids considered the contract claims individually and still
considered the copyright claims.9
The Elan Associates court denied relief to the plaintiff by inter-
preting the complaint to place the claim in state court as a question
of title, rather than using the "strangers" doctrine applied in New
Kids. If, however, the court had used the "strangers" theory, it would
have recognized that the parties were not associated at all, for the
breach of contract had placed the parties in the same situation as
the parties in New Kids.
IV. SCHOENBERG V. SHAPOLSKYPUBLISHERS, INC.: AN ATTEMPT TO
SIFT THROUGH THE MuRKINEss
A. Introduction
The two interpretations of T.B. Harms could not coexist as they
stood forever. For almost thirty years, the courts of the Second Cir-
cuit had tripped over themselves, formulating new arguments from
a single paragraph. Parties were never certain whether they would
86. New Kids, 780 F. Supp. at 1008.
87. Id. at 1008-09. The "stranger" test was first formulated in Kanakos v. MX Trad-
ing Corp., 216 U.S.P.Q. 1030 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), which held that "[w]here a licensee utilizes
a copyrighted work in a manner or to an extent not authorized by the license agreement,
the licensee's position is no different from that of an infringer having no contractual rela-
tionship with the holder of the copyright." Id. at 1032.
88. New Kids, 780 F. Supp. at 1009. Patterson's use of this line of reasoning is most
interesting, as it seems obvious that, had there been two written contracts rather than
just one, the case would have, by necessity, been one for validity of contract. Using his
rationale, however, the contracts become almost worthless.
89. 339 F. Supp. 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
90. Id. at 462.
91. New Kids, 780 F. Supp. at 1009.
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have to relitigate their -claims in other courts, and even a carefully
worded complaint could not be counted on to resolve jurisdictional
questions.
Because of this uncertainty one interpretation had to be chosen
to assure fairness, predictability and equity in court. The solution
arose in the Second Circuit in the 1992 case of Schoenberg v.
Shapolsky Publishers, Inc.92
Harris 0. Schoenberg, the author of "A Mandate for Terror: The
United Nations and the PLO," entered into a publishing agreement
with Steimatzky Publishing of North America, Inc. whereby Stei-
matzky would publish Schoenberg's work.3 Schoenberg retained the
copyright, but granted a license to Steimatzky to publish the book.
Steimazky agreed to: (1) publish the work within six months of re-
ceipt of the final draft; (2) promote and market the work in book
form; (3) license foreign-language editions; and (4) license excerpts of
the work in periodical publications.94
After publication of the book in 1989, Schoenberg filed suit in
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
alleging, among other things, that the publishers had breached the
contract by failing to perform the four duties to which they had
agreed. 95 Defendants were served a set of interrogatories as well as a
request to produce documents. Defendant answered the interroga-
tories, but Mr. Abady, defendant's counsel, informed plaintiff that
although the documents requested would be produced as soon as
possible a definite date could not be provided because his client "was
a busy man."96
The court granted plaintiffs motion to compel discovery; Mr.
Abady refused to comply with it on the grounds that he should be
permitted to file a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter juris-
diction before being required to complete discovery. After his peti-
tion for a writ of mandamus in the Second Circuit requesting vaca-
92. 971 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1992).
93. Id. at 928.
94. Id. The final draft of the manuscript, delivered in 1985, was not published until
September 15, 1989. By that time, Steimatzky Publishing of North America, Inc., had
changed ownership and was known as Shapolsky Publishers, Inc. Having assumed cer-
tain assets and liabilities of Steimatzky, including Schoenberg's contract, Shapolsky was
bound by the terms of the contract. Id.
95. Id.
96. Schoenberg v. Shapolsky Publishers, 140 F.R.D. 282, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). When
the answers to the interrogatories were delivered to plaintiffs counsel on March 13, 1991,
Mr. Abady told plaintiff that he was gathering the necessary documents and would send
them along promptly. Id. at 283. After three unanswered letters and a conference be-
tween the parties, plaintiffs counsel made a request to compel discovery pursuant to Fed-




tion of the Rule 37 order was denied, Abady maintained his refusal
to comply with the order and, therefore, was held in contempt of that
order. 8 Maintaining that the district court did not have jurisdiction
over the underlying complaint, Abady appealed to the Second Cir-
cuit.
B. The Altimari Analysis of Second Circuit Decisions
Judge Altimari, writing for the majority, began his analysis
noting that the question of whether the breach of a contract licens-
ing or assigning a copyright gives rise to federal jurisdiction under
the Copyright Act is a complex issue in a murky area that has per-
plexed and divided the Second Circuit.9 9 He, as did judges confront-
ing the issue before him, looked first to T.B. Harms v. Eliscu.00
Altimari, unlike his predecessors in the Second Circuit, looked
to the facts of T.B. Harms before blindly applying the test enunci-
ated by Judge Friendly. Although Friendly stated that federal ju-
risdiction did not arise where the sole issue was one of copyright
ownership without any allegations of infringement, Altimari real-
ized that T.B. Harms did not address the problem in the instant
case. He decided that the real problem was "whether a claim assert-
ing infringement as a result of a breach of contract licensing or as-
signing a copyright arises under the copyright act."10' Therefore, the
blind application of the T.B. Harms test was inappropriate.
In T.B. Harms, Judge Friendly wrote that, "an action 'arises
under' the Copyright Act if and only if the complaint is for a remedy
expressly granted by the Act, e.g. a suit for infringement.""2 Since
Schoenberg was seeking damages for the alleged infringement as
well as an injunction against future infringements, Altimari stated,
that he was clearly asserting a claim "arising under" the Copyright
Act. 03
Citing the opinion in Berger v. Simon & Schuster, in which
Judge Sand looked beyond the face of the allegations to determine
that the plaintiff was seeking a declaratory judgement to allow him
to publish his materials under more favorable terms, Altimari
98. Abady did, however, produced a "batch of photocopies of documents," Id. at 285,
which he claimed fulfilled his obligations under the Rule 37 order by fulfilling all legiti-
mate document requests. Id. at 285. The court found these documents insufficient to
qualify as compliance with the order, and held Abady in civil contempt of its order com-
pelling discovery. Shapolsky, 971 F.2d at 930.
99. Shapolsky, 971 F.2d at 931.
100. Id. See also supra note 34 and accompanying text (detailing cases which have
applied T.B. Harms).
101. Id.
102. T.B. Harms v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1964).
103. Shapolsky, 971 F.2d at 931.
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pointed out that some courts have used this rationale to support the
"broader proposition that no claim arises under the Copyright Act
whenever an infringement would necessarily result from the breach
of a contract that licensed or assigned a copyright."" 4 Altimari re-
jected this proposition, espoused by many courts in the Southern
District, on the grounds that it is at odds with the T.B. Harms doc-
trine.10 5
C. Proposed Three-Prong Test for "Arising Under" Jurisdiction
Finding no satisfactory doctrine to apply to the case at hand,
Judge Altimari looked beyond the boundaries of the Second Circuit
and applied the test used by the court in Costello Publishing Co. v.
Rotelle:'0 6
a district court must determine whether the complaint alleges a breach of
condition to, or a covenant of, the contract licensing or assigning the
copyright.... If a breach of a condition is alleged, then the district court
has subject matter jurisdiction.... However, if the complaint merely al-
leges a breach of a covenant in the agreement... then the court must
next determine whether the breach is so material as to create a right of
rescission in the grantor.... If the breach would create a right of rescis-
sion, then the asserted claim arises under the Copyright Act.'0 7
To clarify the Costello test, Altimari proposed a three-prong test
suggested not only by the D.C. Circuit in Costello, but also by T.B.
Harms and Berger, to determine whether an action arises under the
Copyright Act. First, the district court must ascertain whether the
infringement claim is merely "incidental" to the claim for a determi-
nation of ownership or contractual rights. Second, the court must
determine if the claim is more than incidental and whether the
complaint alleges a breach of a condition or a covenant.' Finally, if
the complaint alleges breach of a covenant, the court must decide
whether the breach is so material as to give the grantor a right of
rescission. 09 If the breach would create a right of rescission, then
the asserted claim arises under the Copyright Act.
Altimari realized that this three-prong test was not new. In
104. Id. at 932 (citing Berger v. Simon & Schuster, 631 F. Supp. 915, 918 (S.D.N.Y.
1986)); See, e.g., Elan Assoc. v. Quackenbush Music, Ltd., 339 F. Supp. 461, 462 (S.D.N.Y
1972).
105. Id.
106. 670 F.2d 1035, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Costello involved the marketing of an un-
authorized book of Catholic prayer as an "authorized version." When the book seller was
told to cease this marketing practice, he refused, and the copyright holders of the official
version brought suit for infringement.
107. Id.
108. Shapolsky, 971 F.2d at 932. See also Costello, 670 F.2d at 1045.
109. Shapolsky, 971 F.2d at 932-33.
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Lukasewych v. Wells, Rich, Greene, Inc.,"° Judge Haight used Judge
Leval's rationale in Foxrun Workshop in a manner similar to Alti-
mar. In Foxrun Workshop, a professional photographer' brought' a
federal action predicated upon 28 U.S.C. § 1338 and alleged in-
fringement due to defendant's failure to pay 'for photographs taken
under contract. Haight looked to the complaint and determined that
the entire action arose out of a contractual dispute regarding pay-
ment and that the claim of infringement was only valid pending a
resolution of that issue."' Approving of this reasoning, Altimari
urged the Second Circuit to follow Haight's line of reasoning.
V. THE PITFALLS OF THE ALTIMAI FORMULATION:
THE SWAMP THICKENS
A. The Three-Prong Test
It may appear that Judge Altimari solved the woes of the Sec-
ond Circuit by adopting the reasoning of Costello Publishing Co. v.
Rotelle."' There are, however, numerous problems associated with
this three-prong test.
1. The "Incidental" Prong. The first prong of the test enunciated
in Shapolsky is particularly troubling. According to this prong, the
district court is to determine whether the infringement claim is
merely incidental. It is the word "incidental" that is most trouble-
some, for it invariably allows judges to exercise excessive discretion.
In most cases, judicial discretion creates no problem."'
In some situations, however, two judges may decide the same
case differently, thereby removing the predictability that many rely
on when dealing with the court system. To add unpredictability to
the judicial decision-making process not only undermines the con-
cept of stare decisis, but also permits judges to reach decisions based
on factors other than settled legal principles." 4
110. 747 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
111. Id. at 1093-94.
112. 670 F.2d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
113. See, e.g., T.B. Harms v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964) (Judge Friendly's
exercise of judicial discretion did not interfere with or impose upon the parties); Berger v.
Simon & Schuster, 631 F. Supp. 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (judicial discretion properly used to
keep one party from getting out of a bad licensing agreement).
114. Though the principle of stare decisis is firmly imbedded in our judicial system
as a means to ensure stability, it has also been criticized as placing certainty over justice.
See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 262-89 (1966).
Without the stability provided by the use of precedent, litigants would be placed at
the mercy of the court system. Without a coherent common law to turn to, those involved
in lawsuits would be forced to second-guess the value judgements of the court in an at-
tempt to secure a favorable judgement.
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2. Condition or Covenant Prong. The second prong of the Alti-
mari test is whether the complaint alleges a violation of a condition
or a covenant of the licensing contract. Altimari's test states that if
the complaint alleges a condition of the contract, then subject matter
jurisdiction exists; if a covenant is alleged to have been violated,
then the district court must go on to the third prong.'
A criticism of this prong goes back to the 1926 Supreme Court
case of Luckett v. Delpark, Inc.,n 6 a case that Judge Friendly cited
extensively in the T.B. Harms opinion. In Luckett, the Court held
that an action against a patent licensee who asked for royalties
owed, an accounting, a declaration that the patent had reverted to
the plaintiff, and an injunction against future alleged infringements
did not arise under the patent laws and there was, therefore, no
subject matter jurisdiction." 7 In the course of the opinion, the Court
explicitly stated that where a complainant "makes his suit one for
recovery of royalties under a contract of license or assignment, or for
damages for a breach of its covenants.., he does not give the federal
District Court jurisdiction...""8 It seems inconsistent for the Sec-
ond Circuit to explicitly depart from precedent upon which it relied
so heavily while giving no reason for doing so."'
3. Rescission Prong. The third prong of the Altimari test applies
if there has been a violation of a covenant rather than a condition of
the contract. If the violation alleged pertains to a covenant, the rele-
vant question is whether not that covenant is such as to lead to a
right of rescission on the part of the plaintiff. The term "right of re-
scission" is the most troublesome here, as there will be some uncer-
tainty about what it means.
If "right of rescission" is taken to mean what it does in the nor-
mal course of dealings, then many cases that allege mere contract
violation will still be granted jurisdiction at the federal level. This
prong was problematic in Rotardier v. The Entertainment Company
Music Group,10 where there was a question of whether the copyright
had actually reverted to the plaintiff due to a breach of contract. In
T.B. Harms, the plaintiff had assigned the rights to a song to be
115. Schoenberg v. Shapolsky Publishers, Inc., 971 F.2d 926, 932-33 (2d Cir. 1992).
116. 270 U.S. 496 (1926).
117. Id. at 510.
118. Id. at 510 (emphasis added). The "covenant" is distinguished from a "condition"
in that the former goes to the very meaning and purpose of the contract while the latter is
only a component of it.
119. The Luckett case, cited in T.B. Harms, buttressed rather than undermined
Judge Friendly's decision; as such, it can still be characterized as "good law." See T.B.
Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 825 (2d Cir. 1964).
120. 518 F. Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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used in a movie, and claimed that since the defendant had not con-
sulted with him prior to use of the rights, they had reverted to him.
The court, noting that the issue was one of who actually owned the
title to the copyright, stated that there was no provision for auto-
matic reversion. 121 The fact that there was no such provision led the
court to state that there was no federal jurisdiction because the
plaintiff had not first established title to the copyright. 22 Also, be-
cause the major issue before the court was one of title, a finding of
infringement would necessarily be only incidental.
23
This decision illustrates the problems created by the third
prong; essentially it forms a loop back to the first. Assuming that a
claim for copyright infringement is found not to be incidental, it
must be determined whether the claim is for the violation of a con-
dition or a covenant. Assuming that the claim is for a covenant, the
court must decide whether there is a right of rescission. In Rotar-
dier, the issue involved a covenant (an agreement to use the rights
within a certain time frame). The violation of that covenant gave the
plaintiff a right of rescission, but the court found that jurisdiction
did not exist because the infringement was merely incidental. 124
When, then, would a breach of contract not lead to an inciden-
tal infringement? If a contract is breached, logically, any additional
harm that arises is merely incidental to that breach. As stated
above, this third prong is simply the dog chasing its own tail.
VI. ALLOWING DUCKS TO SWIM THE MURKY WATERS
A. Interpreting Judicial Interpretations of T.B. Harms v. Eliscu
The tests that the courts of the Second Circuit have used to
determine whether an action arises under the copyright laws have,
as this Comment has shown, resulted in a scene which is almost
comical.
The problem with the judicial interpretations of the T.B. Harms
test is that courts have failed to comprehend what lies at the heart
of each controversy. In each of the cases studied, a copyright license
had been executed and, in one way or another, breached. The court
in each case maintained that the license was no different than any
commercial contract, as it contained the same elements. This mis-
characterization is the root of the problem stemming from T.B.
Harms.
121. Id. at 921.
122. Id. (citing Muse v. Mellon, 212 F. Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), affd, 339 F.2d 888
(2d Cir. 1964)).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 921.
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A copyright assignment license is not a contract and must not
be treated as one. A license, unlike a contract, simply involves one
party permitting another party to make use of the fruits of an intel-
lectual endeavor. In a licensing situation, the copyright owner sells a
portion of the rights granted under the Copyright Act,'25 but not all
of them.
A claim for copyright infringement arises if it states a claim for
which relief can be granted under the Copyright Act. If it does not
state such a claim, then basic civil procedure mandates that the
complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief
can be granted; 26 after all, if the court is not able to grant relief then
there is no point for it to hear the case. If, however, the claim does
state such a claim, then the court must hear the case."' If the fed-
eral court refuses to hear a case over which it has exclusive jurisdic-
tion, justice is effectively denied the claimant.
B. A Clarification of the Problem
A hypothetical may clarify the situation: A young woman hears
a song on her grandmother's phonograph and decides that she
should put it on her own upcoming record. She contacts the holder of
the copyright and enters into a licensing agreement whereby she
will be permitted to make use of the copyright for a period of one
year in return for a portion of the gross profits derived from the sale
of any sound recordings containing the song.
The woman's rendition of the song hits number one on the Bill-
board charts. She begins a two year worldwide tour and sings the
song at each concert she plays. The copyright holder discovers that
the song has been performed after the one year deadline and, more
importantly, he is not getting his royalties. He sues the woman in
federal court for copyright infringement, claiming that she is no
longer permitted to use the song and must be enjoined from doing so
in the future.
The federal court, looking to the "essence of the complaint,"
finds that the claim is actually based on contract violations; as such,
it dismisses the actions. Both sides pay their legal fees, and the
woman continues to sing what the world now believes to be her song.
125. According to the Copyright Act of 1976, the copyright holder has five
fundamental rights: the exclusive right of reproduction, adaptation, publication, perform-
ance and display. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1993).
126. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (1992).
127. So long as a right or immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the
United States is an essential element of the plaintiffs cause of action, the case is consid-
ered to be under the jurisdiction of the federal courts. See Gully v. First National Bank,
299 U.S. 109 (1936).
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Frustrated, the copyright holder re-files the complaint in state
court. The state court, agreeing that the complaint is one for con-
tract violations, hears the case and decides for the copyright holder,
who receives damages in the amount of royalties owed. The -state
court, however, is unable to grant injunctive relief because the na-
ture of the contract involves a copyright; therefore, the singer con-
tinues to sing the song.12
With the contract claim out of his way, the copyright holder
goes back to federal court for injunctive relief as provided for by the
Copyright Act. The court, agreeing to hear the case, decides -that
there is really a copyright infringement and issues an injunction.
C. The Case for Judicial Economy and an Alternative Test:
A Curious Mixture of "Well-Pled" and "Essence of the Claim"
This is not an absurd tale, but a very likely scenario if the
courts continue to use either of the judicially-created rules for de-
termining subject-matter jurisdiction. In the hypothetical, three sets
of legal fees were paid and three sets of documents were filed as the
case moved from federal to state court and back again. What could
have been accomplished in one case has now taken three, and what
one bench could have done has been handled by three.
Indeed, Judge Altimari realized that the proposition that "no
claim arises under the Copyright Act whenever an infringement
would necessarily result from the breach of a contract that licensed
or assigned a copyright"129 is at odds with the entire T.B. Harms ra-
tionale.10 However, the test that the Shapolsky court proposes is no
better than those proposed by earlier decisions, as the three-prong
test grants judges excessively wide latitude to determine matters
with which many of them are unfamiliar.'3 '
There is, however, a simple test that should, and could, be ap-
plied by the courts. If the claim is based on a copyright license, then
it arises under the federal laws. Stated more simply, if it walks like
a duck and talks like a duck then, in all likelihood, it is a duck. This
"Duck Test" may at first glance seem to be overly simplistic, but
upon careful study is quite appropriate to swim in the murky waters
created by T.B. Harms.
128. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1338, the power to issue injunctive relief in such cases is in
the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts.
129. Schoenberg v. Shapolsky Publishers, Inc., 971 F.2d 926, 932 (2d Cir. 1992).
130. Id.
131. The "incidental" prong of Judge Altimari's test, discussed supra page 137, is a
subjective criterion and, as such, grants the court wide latitude.
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1. It talks like a duck. The first step a court would take would
be to read the complaint. If it is grounded in copyright, then it is a
case for copyright. While the question of whether the complaint is
actually grounded in copyright might complicate matters, it can be
overcome relatively quickly.
The Copyright Act allows federal courts to grant injunctive re-
lief. 1 2 If the plaintiff seeks damages then there is no claim upon
which relief can be granted. Even if injunctive relief is requested, it
does not necessarily follow that a copyright claim has been stated-
an injunction can be granted by federal as well as state courts in a
number of situations, copyright being only one of them.
2. It walks like a duck. Assuming injunctive relief is requested,
the court must move on to the second level of analysis required un-
der this proposed test. This second level incorporates many of the
facets of the "essence of the claim" test without the subjectivity that
stems from the use of such a test. Under this second level of analysis
the court is forced to look not only at what is being requested, but
also at what the plaintiff owned before suit was brought.
The court should next examine what gave rise to the suit. If the
complaint arises out of a copyright license, then the court must look
to see who is harmed and who is helped by the breach of the license,
and in what way each party is affected. In a breach of contract, one
party gets something that he does not deserve and the other party
does not receive something that she believed she had coming to her.
In contrast, the copyright infringer gets something that he does not
deserve, but the copyright holder loses the right to something that
was hers and is still hers; it amounts to theft in the abstract, though
on its face it is a violation of a contract right.33
The court should determine if this theft has occurred. If the
plaintiff, the copyright holder, alleges a violation of a right normally
secured by the federal copyright laws, then such a theft has oc-
curred.'34 Consequently, the action must be heard in a federal court.
132. 17 U.S.C. § 502 (1988). Under this section, the court may grant injunctions and
restraining orders, whether "preliminary," "temporary," "interlocutory," "permanent," or
"final," to prevent or stop infringements of copyright. Id.
133. The analogy to theft is clearly supported by the "stranger" theory espoused by
Judge Patterson in Marshall v. New Kids on the Block Partnership, 780 F. Supp. 1005
(S.D.N.Y. 1991). See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
Since, as Judge Patterson held, jurisdiction is to turn on whether the uses were
within the scope of the license, New Kids, 780 F. Supp. at 1009, the analogy to theft
would be that jurisdiction should turn on whether the use of the copyright amounted to a
theft of the copyright holder's statutory rights. In essence, these two formulations are
identical.
134. Judge Friendly, instigator of the debate, stated that "an action 'arises under'
the Copyright Act if and only if the complaint is for a remedy expressly granted by the Act
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3. So it's a duck. The analysis is deceptively simple, which may
explain why no court has used it; courts use imposing language and
lofty principles, but in making a determination such as this there is
no reason why a simple test may not be used. More importantly, this
two pronged test would make the judge's job of determining what
was before her much easier.'35
The T.B. Harms test implicitly uses this formulation. In hold-
ing the American Well Works test inapplicable, 13 Judge Friendly
noted that federal copyright laws do not create a cause of action to
fix the locus of ownership.'37 Using the Duck Test, one can easily see
that the reason for this is that there is no need to do so; the owner of
the copyright already has the rights.
As with both the "essence of the claim" and the "well-pled com-
plaint" rules, the Duck Test seeks to uncover what the complaint is
really about. If the action involves two parties bargaining to ex-
change something then it is a contract claim; if, however, it is for one
party to recover something which has been stolen, then it is for
copyright infringement.
The Duck Test also implicitly makes use of the formulation
used in Shoenberg v. Shapolsky Publishers, Inc. Judge Altimari
maintained, "if the complaint merely alleges a breach of a covenant
in the agreement licensing or assigning the copyright, then the court
must next determine whether the breach is so material that it cre-
ated a right of rescission in the grantor. If the breach would create a
right of rescission, then the asserted claim arises under the Copy-
right Act."38 Rather than permitting the uncertainty and subjectiv-
ity of the Altimari formulation to control the resolution of the issue,
the Duck Test holds that where theft of the rights of a copyright
holder occurs due to a breach of a contract, thereby leading to a
... or asserts a claim requiring construction of the Act... or, at the very least... pre-
sents a case where a distinctive policy of the Act requires that federal principles control
the disposition of the claim." T.B. Harms v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1964).
135. By outlining a simple yet strict set of guidelines for a federal court to use, this
theory permits the court to render a decision without complicating matters for itself, as
well as for courts making use of the decision later on.
As is evidenced by the decisions of the Second Circuit when dealing with this issue,
the lack of a coherent set of guidelines has led to a line of decisions that lack uniformity.
See discussion of cases, supra. As such, the decisions go against the clearly enunciated
desire of Congress to make the Copyright Act of 1976 "much more effective in carrying
out the basic constitutional aims of uniformity." H.REP. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 129,
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CA.N. 5659, 5745.
136. The test, formulated by-Justice Holmes, stated that a suit arises under the law
that creates the cause of action. American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241
U.S. 257, 260 (1916).
137. T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 826-27.




claim of infringement, the asserted claim arises under the Act.
D. Shaking the Duck's Tailfeathers "
Under the "essence of the claim" doctrine, the parties may be
required to litigate in state court before proceeding onto federal
court, thereby causing an inefficiency of the judicial process. The
preferable course of action, especially in light of the overwhelming
dockets with which most federal and state are burdened, would be to
hear the case once. If there is a claim for copyright infringement and
the Duck Theory holds water (pardon the pun), then it seems logical
that the federal court should hear the case and make a ruling; that
the plaintiff has brought the action in federal court indicates the fact
that what is truly desired is a return to the status quo. Ostensibly, a
damage award alone will not do so. It would be akin to taking the
bullet out of the victim without confiscating the defendant's gun.
An award of damages will financially reimburse the plaintiff for
the defendant's use of the copyrighted materials but will fail to
foreclose any future use; the plaintiff may not demand injunctive
relief, as this would be a matter relating to a copyright and, there-
fore, would not be actionable at the state level. 3 9 In federal court,
however, injunctive relief as well as monetary damages may be
awarded. 140
The Duck Theory also shakes the criticism of the "essence of
the claim" theory that states that the judge should look to what she
perceives to be the plaintiffs primary and controlling purpose. Once
it is determined what the plaintiff had and what the plaintiff seeks
to recover, the primary purpose becomes clear. In a contract case,
the primary purpose would be to put the plaintiff in the same posi-
tion that she would have occupied had the contract been successfully
completed; in the copyright infringement case, however, the primary
purpose is to allow the plaintiff to have full and undivided use of her
property.
VII. CONCLUSION
The three tests enunciated by the Second Circuit are far from
ideal, mainly because the courts simply do not understand that a
copyright license is not a contract in the ordinary sense. The copy-
right license seeks to attain ends different from a contract and in-
139. -28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1993).
140. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (1988). This section provides for actual damages, profits and
statutory damages. By providing for such damages, the Copyright Act permits the plain-
tiff to return to the status quo (by demanding some measure of damages), as well as to
erect a barrier against future infringements (by seeking injunctive relief).
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volves rights and duties that set it apart from a contract in most re-
spects.
Until the courts of the Second Circuit understand the essential
elements of intellectual property, problems will continue to plague
claimants as well as lawyers entering the courtroom with intellec-
tual property disputes. Perhaps alternate dispute resolution will
play a larger role in these disputes, with arbitrators well-versed in
this area of the law providing a safe haven for those who would
bring suit in copyright, patent or trademark infringement. It is more
likely, however, that claimants will continue to bring suit in federal
court and hope that the court will agree with the wording of the
complaint as well as the "essence of the claim" to hold that the ac-
tion belongs in federal court.
The court in Schoenberg v. Shapolsky Publishers, Inc. at-
tempted to clear up the murky waters and come up with a balance
between the two opposing views of the issue. Of course, the three-
pronged test is less than perfect. It suffers from flaws which afflict
almost any theory and it is guaranteed to produce an imperfect re-
sult at least some of the time. To permit a court discretion in judg-
ment is an essential piece of the American jurisprudence puzzle; to
give virtually free rein, however, is not.
The Duck Theory, on the other hand, permits the court some
discretion, but pulls the reins in before the horses are off and run-
ning. This formulation is coherent, stable, and will permit litigants
some of the predictability and stability that is necessary if our judi-
cial system is to function efficiently and fairly.
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